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THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE AND APPELLATE REVIEW 
OF DISCOVERY ORDERS IN NEBRASKA 
In Lund v. Holbrook1 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that 
no appeal could be taken until after final judgment from an order 
requiring a party to turn over documents to his opponent for 
inspection and copying. The basis for the decision was a statute 
limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to the re-
view of a "judgment rendered or final order."2 "Final order" 
is defined by statute as one which " ... in effect determines the 
action and prevents a judgment."3 The same rule would undoubt-
edly by applied to any other discovery order in Nebraska. 
This "final judgment" rule exists in some form in almost 
every state.4 The application of the rule in Lund v. Holbrook is 
1157 Neb. 854, 63 N.W.2d 112 (1954). 
2Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 1948). The same provision is 
made as to the appellate jurisdiction of the district court on appeal from 
the "county court, justice of the peace, or any other tribunal, board or 
officer exercising judicial functions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the 
district court .... " Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1948). 
a Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1948). 
4 New Hampshire appears to be the only state which does not have 
the final judgment rule. See discussion in Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 261, 
81 Atl. 1081, 1082 (1911) where the court says, "The theory that ques-
tions of law could be finally determined only by a writ of error after final 
judgment has been so long abandoned as to be practically unknown to 
practitioners at this bar." 
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in line with the rulings of the majority of states as to discovery 
orders.5 The purpose of the rule is to reduce the volume of appeals 
which would, in the absence of the rule, clog the calendars of ap-
pellate courts and cause interminable delay in litigation.6 
Many states have modified the final judgment rule by stat-
ute to allow immediate appeal from specified orders which are 
not reviewable under the majority rule until after final judgment. 
The reason for these modifications may be either that the final 
judgment rule does not fulfill its puropses, or that the assump-
tion underlying the rule (i.e., that the effect of any error on the 
part of the trial court can be remedied by a new trial) has proved 
to be untrue. 
The decision in Lund v. Holbrook7 illustrates another type 
of order, the discovery order, which may be worthy of consider-
ation as justifying a departure from the final judgment rule. 
We propose to examine: 
(a) the effect of the final judgment rule in cases involving 
discovery orders, to determine whether departure from the final 
judgment rule is justified, 
(b) the means presently existing in Nebraska for avoiding 
the effect of the final judgment rule as to discovery orders, and 
(c) the desirability of, and possibilities for statutory mod-
ification of the final judgment rule as to discovery orders in Ne-
braska. 
I. THE EFFECT OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE IN 
DISCOVERY CASES 
A. Types of Discovery Procedures. 
Nebraska procedure provides several means by which a party 
may elicit information from other persons before trial. These 
procedures may be used either by plaintiffs or defendants. Some 
may be used only against parties, and some may be used against 
any person having the desired information. Disclosure of " . . . 
5 See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 586 (1954). 
6 See Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1186 (1949) and cases cited therein. Crick, 
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539 (1932) con-
cludes that the desire of appellate courts to prevent being swamped with 
appeals ls the policy underlying the final judgment rule, but the authori-
ties cited therein seem to support equally well the proposition that the 
purposes of the rule include the prevention of delay and expense to liti-
gants. 
7 157 Neb. 854, 62 N.W.2d 112 (1954). 
SNeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.02 (Supp. 1955). 
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any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action .... " may be required.8 It is no 
objection that the matter sought to be discovered would not be 
admissible at the trial if it appears ". . . reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."9 
The one discovery procedure usable against either parties or 
non-parties is the taking of depositions.10 Depositions may be 
taken either upon oral examination or upon written interroga-
tories.11 Subpoenas may be issued to require the attendance of 
witnesses, and subpoenas may be issued to require the attendance 
of witnesses, and subpoenas duces tecum may be used to require 
witnesses to produce documents and other material evidence.12 
Notice to adverse parties is required for the taking of all deposi-
tions,13 but leave of court is required only if the notice of taking 
the deposition is to be served by the plaintiff within twenty days 
after the commencement of the action.14 
The remaining discovery procedures may be used only against 
parties. Notice and a showing of "good cause" are required be-
fore the court will enter orders requiring parties to produce docu-
ments for inspection and copying,15 permit entry on land,1G or 
submit to mental or physical examination.17 Other procedures 
which may be used only against parties are requests for admission 
of facts and the genuineness of documents, and written interrog-
atories, for both of which answers must be served in writing. 
Notice is not required for this procedure, and leave of court is 
required only if the requests or interrogatories are made within 
ten days after commencement of action.18 
Upon the failure of a party or witness to answer a question 
on a deposition, the court may enter an order requiring the de-
9 Ibid. 
10 Id. § 25-1267 .01. 
11 Id. § 25-1267.01. 
12 Id. § 25-1267.01 (" ... The attendance of witnesses may be com-
pelled by the use of subpoena as proided by law."); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-
1224 (Reissue 1948) ("The subpoena ... may contain a clause directing 
a witness to bring with him any book, writing or other thing under his 
control, which he is bound by law to produce as evidence."). 
13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.20 (Supp. 1955). 
14 Id. § 25-1267.01. 
15 Id. § 25-1267.39. 
16 Id. § 25-1267.39. 
17 Id. § 25-1267.40. 
18 Id. §§ 25-1267.37, 25-1267.41. 
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ponent to answer.19 We will speak of this type of order, together 
with the other orders described above, as discovery orders, as 
distinguished from orders entered to compel compliance with 
them.20 The orders compelling compliance we will speak of as 
discovery "sanctions." 
B. Possibilities of Harm from the Operation of Discover Orders 
It is suggested above that discovery orders may be worthy 
of consideration as presenting reasons for a modification of the 
final judgment rule. The reasons we speak of are based on the 
possibilities of serious harm to parties or witnesses arising out 
of the operation of discovery procedures. vVe proceed to discuss 
these reasons. 
1. Delay and Expense Caused by the Final Judgment Rule. 
The usual procedure for correcting errors committed by a 
trial court is a retrial of the case, after an appeal from final judg-
ment and a decision by the appellate court that the error was 
prejudicial. The procedure may involve, for both parties, the 
considerable delay and expense required for a new trial, which 
might have been made unnecessary by an interlocutory appeal 
before final judgment. The delay and expense of an interlocutory 
appeal may, however, be just as great, and the final judgment 
rule proceeds upon the theory that it is better to impose upon the 
complaining party the burden of a new trial, than to give him the 
opportunity of causing even greater delay and expense to the other 
party by several interlocutory appeals. In this respect, the dis-
covery order presents no more persuasive reason for allowing 
interlocutory appeal than does any other interlocutory order. 
There is always the possibility that the party complaining of the 
granting or denial of the discovery order will win on final judg-
ment, so that an appeal will not be desired by him. Furthermore, 
the erroneous granting or denial of the order may not, even though 
the complaining party loses, have been prejudicial to his interests 
at the trial. These factors are impossible of determination until 
after the trial. 
19 Id. § 25-1267.43. Although copied from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Nebraska discovery statutes omit the provision of Federal 
Rule 37 (a) that a party may be required to answer questions propounded 
on an interrogatory to a party. It is believed, however, that the inherent 
power of the court to give effect to procedures provided for is sufficient 
to enable the court to compel an answer. See Healey, Discovery and 
Preparation for Trial, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 292, 298 (1953). 
20 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44 (Supp. 1955). 
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We conclude that the delay and expense is not a persuasive 
reason for allowing interlocutory appeals from them. But there 
are other factors, inherent in discovery, which are more persuasive. 
2. Irreparable Injury. 
Discovery procedures present a danger of injury which is not 
found in the usual interlocutory order. The right to conduct 
fishing expeditions, granted by the discovery rules, may give rise 
to difficult questions concerning privilege, good cause, notice, and 
intended scope of the discovery statutes. (For the purposes of 
this discussion let us call the one seeking discovery the "inquirer," 
and the one against whom the discovery order runs the "with-
holder.") The order may erroneously require the withholder to 
disclose matter which is privileged, such as a communication be-
tween attorney and client,21 physician and patient,22 priest and 
penitent,23 or husband and wife,24 or matter tending to incrimin-
ate the withholder.25 Questions involving, for example, whether 
the attorney's "work product,"26 trade secrets,27 reports furnished 
to parties by expert witnesses,28 the coverage furnished by the 
withholder's liability insurance policy,29 or the withholder's in-
come tax return30 are proper subjects of discovery, may also arise. 
When the withholder gives up information, it can never be 
erased from the inquirer's knowledge. If the erroneously required 
disclosure is an injury, it is an irreparable one. An appeal from 
final judgment does not repair the injury. It attempts to shut 
the gate after the cows are out, but unlike the cows, the informa-
tion disclosed cannot be effectively brought back. This applies, 
of course, only to the order granting discovery. 31 
21 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1206 (Reissue 1948). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Id. § 25-1204. 
25 Id. § 25-1210. 
26 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
21 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.22 (Supp. 1955) provides that the court 
may, upon motion of a party or person to be examined on a deposition, 
make an order that secret processes, developments, or research need not 
be disclosed. 
28 See 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 26.24 (2d ed. 1950). 
29 See, e.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649 (:Minn. 1955); Lund 
v. Holbrook, 157 Neb. 854, 62 N.W.2d 112 (1954). 
30 See Peterson v. Peterson, 70 S.D. 385, 17 N.W.2d 920 (1945) (in-
come tax report in files of Internal Revenue Bureau privileged). 
31 See discussion in Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 29-32, 
62 N.W.2d 688, 698-699 (1954). 
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The same concept, i.e., that the effect of error in granting 
certain orders cannot be relieved on appeal from final judgment, 
seems to be the basis for some of the exceptions made to the final 
judgment by statute in many states.32 Interlocutory appeal is 
quite commonly allowed by statute in cases involving, for ex-
ample, injunctions, 33 partitions, 34 receivership, 35 and attachment. 36 
It should be possible, by requiring the posting of bond, to protect 
the pecuniary interests of parties pending appeal in many such 
actions. But that sort of protection is hardly sufficient in cases 
involving discovery, where the withholder may, as a result of 
being required to disclose information, be subjected to criminal 
prosecution where the privilege against self-incrimination is in-
32See discussion in Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1186, 1187 (1949). 
33 Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1702 (1939); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2102 (1947); 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 963 (1953); Colo. R. Civ. P. lll(a) (3); Del. Const. 
art. 4, § 11(4), (5); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 59.02 (Supp. 1955); Idaho Code 
Ann. § 13-201 (1947); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 78 (Supp. 1956); Kan. 
Gen. Stat. § 60-3302 (1949); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 31 
(1951); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 (1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.020 
(1949); lliont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 43-8003 (1947); Nev. Comp. Laws § 
9385.60 (Supp. 1941); N.J. Sup. Ct. rule 2 :2-3 (a) ~1); N.D. Rev. Code 
§ 28-2702 (1943); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 952 (Supp. 1955); Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 12, §§ 1101, 1102 (1953); S.C. Code § 15-123 (1952); S.D. Code § 
33.0701 (5) (1939); Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. art. 4662, Tex. Stat., Civ. Proc. 
rule 583 (1948); Va. Code § 8-462 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.88.010 
(1951); W. Va. Code Ann.§ 5788(g)· (1949); Wis. Stat.§ 274.3~ (1953). 
3!Ariz. Code Ann.§ 21-17·02 (1939); Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 963 (1953); 
Del. Const. art. 4, § 11(4). (5); D.C. Code Ann. § 11-772 (1951); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 59.02 (Supp. 1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 13-201 (1947); 
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 (1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.02 (1949); 
Nev. Comp. Laws § 9385.60 (Supp. 1941); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1093 
(1953); Va. Code§ 8-462 (1950); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788(g). 
3G Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1702 (1939); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2102 (1947); 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 963 (1953); Colo. R. Civ. P. lll(a)(4); Del. 
Const. art. 4, § 11(4), (5); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 59.02 (Supp. 1955); Ill. Ann. 
Stat. c. 110, § 78 (Supp. 1956); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 60-3302 (1949); Md. 
Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 31 (1951); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 
(1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.020 (1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 43-
8003 (1947); Nev. Comp. Laws § 9385.60 (Supp. 1941); N.J. Sup. Ct. 
Rule 2:2-3(a) (2); s.c. Code § 15-123 (1952); S.D. Code § 33.0701(5) 
(1939); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.88.010 (1951). 
3GDel. Const. art. 4, §'11(4), (5); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 59.02 (Supp. 1955); 
Idaho Code Ann § 13-201 (1947); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 31 
(1951); lliass, Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 605.09 
(West 1948); lllont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 43-8003 (1947); Nev. Comp. Laws 
§ 9385.60 (Supp. 1941); N.D. Rev. Code § 28-2702 (1943); Okla Stat. tit. 
12, § 952 (Supp. 1955); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1108 (1953); S.D. Code 
§ 33.0701(5) (1939); Va. Code § 8-462 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code § 
4.88.010 (1951); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788 (h) (1949); Wis. Stat. § 274.33 
(1953). 
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volved, the loss of business prospects where trade secrets are in-
volved, the loss of the prospect of reasonable settlement in cases 
where the coverage limits of an insurance policy are involved, or 
the loss of an advantage at the trial where th~ matter sought to 
be reached is the attorney's work-product, or the opposing party's 
theory of the facts of the case. Whether disclosure of any of 
these matters should or should not be required is not the immed-
iate problem. The problem is rather to find a means of resolving 
the issue of whether disclosure should be required, without caus-
ing irreparable injury to the withholder if the question happens 
to have been wrongly decided in the trial court. 
II. METHODS OF AVOIDING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE 
A. Discover1J Sanctions 
The sanctions provided by the discovery rules for their en-
forcement may provide a means of obtaining appellate review of 
orders which are not immediately appealable. These sanctions 
include: (1) a judgment of civil or criminal contempt, available 
against either parties or non-parties ;37 (2) an order, against a 
party, that the facts which the inquirer was attempting to estab-
lish by discovery be taken as established;38 (3) orders limiting 
the introduction of evidence by the party against whom discovery 
is sought ;39 ( 4) orders striking pleadings or parts thereof ;40 ( 5) 
orders staying proceedings until the order is obeyed, (useful only 
against a plaintiff) ;41 ( 6) orders dismissing the action where the 
plaintiff refuses to comply ;42 and (7) orders rendering a default 
judgment where the defendant refuses to comply.43 
37Neb. Rev. Stat. § 1267.44(1) (Supp. 1955). Feµ. R. Civ. P. 37(b) 
provides not only that refusal to answer a question on a deposition may 
be considered contempt, but that an order directing arrest may be used as 
a sanction for the disobedience of any discovery order except one for physi-
cal or mental examination The Nebraska statute omits the latter sanc-
tion. There seems little doubt, however, that contempt may be used as 
a sanction for the disobedience of any discovery order, apparently even 
one for a mental or physical examination, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2121 
(3) (Reissue 1948), the general contempt statute. 
38 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44 (2) (a); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2) 
(i). 
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44 (2) (b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2) 
(ii). 
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1. Finality of Orders Imposing Sanctions. 
The opportunity for a party or witness to get review of a 
discovery order by appeal from any of these orders imposing 
sanctions depends upon whether the order imposing the sanction 
is final. An order dismissing the action, or rendering default 
judgment is clearly final, and therefore immediately appealable;H 
The others are not final, and therefore not immediately appeal-
able, 4u with the exception of a judgment of contempt. 
When civil or criminal contempt is the sanction used for en-
forcement of a discovery order, a petition in error may be used to 
review the order in Nebraska.46 In the federal courts, if a judg-
ment of contempt is construed as being entirely civil in character, 
and runs against a party of record, it is not appealable except 
in connection with a final judgment or order.47 A non-party 
may, of course, appeal from either civil or criminal contempt 
judgments, since he cannot take an appeal from final judgment. 
In Nebraska, review is allowed by petition in error in both civil 
and criminal contempt cases whether the contempt judgment is 
H See Davis v. Jennings, 78 Neb. 412, 111 N.W. 128 (1907) (dismissal 
of action without prejudice held to be final order and appealable). There 
appear to be no Nebraska cases on the question of whether a default judg-
ment entered for failure to comply with a discovery order or other order of 
the court is final and appealable. But see Anson v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989, 
25 N.W.2d 896 (1947) holding that an order overruling a demurrer is 
not final, and that no appeal will be allowed from it unless defendant 
elects to stand on his demurrer and submit to the rendition of a judgment 
against him. This is substantially the same situation as that presented 
by a defendaat's election to stand on his refusal to comply with a dis-
covery order and submit to the rendition of a default judgment against 
him. See also 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 26.37[2] (2d ed. 1950). 
4G See State ex r~l. Sorenson v. State Bank of Omaha, 131 Neb. 223, 
267 N.W. 532 (1936) (order sustaining motion to strike part of answer 
not final and not appealable) ; Welch v. Calhoun, 22 Neb. 166, 34 N.W. 
349 (1887) (order sustaining motion to strike amended petition from the 
files not an appealable order). See also 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 
26.37[2] (2d ed. 1950). 
46 Appeal from a judgment of contempt may be taken only by petition 
in error, Frye v. Frye, 158 Neb. 694, 64 N.W.2d 648 (1954); Gross v. 
Garfield County, 145 Neb. 414, 16 N.W.2d 850 (1944); Whipple v. Nelson, 
138 Neb. 514, 293 N.W. 382 (1940); Maryott v. State, 124 Neb. 274, 246 
N.W. 343 (1933); Gentle v. Pante! Realty Co., 120 Neb. 630, 234 N.W. 
574 (1931); Hawthorne v. State, 45 Neb. 871, 64 N.W. 359 (1895). 
Habeas Corpus will lie to review only the question of whether the im-
prisonment order is void, and the question of whether the contempt judg-
ment is merely in error is not raised, In re Niklaus, 144 Neb. 503, 13 
N.W.2d 655 (1944); Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 191 N.W. 704 (1922). 
47 Dickinson v. Rinke, 132 F.2d 884, 885 (2d Cir. 1943). See also 
In re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819, 824 ( 2d Cir. 1941). 
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against a party or a non-party.48 A party in the action, of course, 
cannot appeal from a judgment of contempt against a witness, 
since he is not a party to the contempt action.49 
It is obvious, then, that the trial court has the power to allow 
review of an interlocutory order by using against the one desir-
ing review a discovery sanction which employs a final order. 
2. Utility of Review by Appeal from Final Discovery Sanc-
tions. 
This method of review is not without disadvantages. An ap-
peal from a default judgment or dismissal of the action may in-
volve the risk that if the withholder loses on appeal, res judicata 
will apply to the merits. For plaintiffs, this difficulty may be 
avoided by a dismissal without prejudice to bringing another ac-
tion.50 But whether to dismiss with or without prejudice is discre-
tionary with the trial judge51 and the decision may depend on 
his feeling as to whether the plaintiff is justified in refusing to 
comply with the discovery order. Even this uncertain means of 
side-stepping the res judicata problem is not available in advance 
for a defendant against whom a default judgment is entered. If 
an appeal from the final judgment of default is decided before 
the end of the term at which it was rendered, which seems un-
likely, and the defendant loses on appeal, he might apply to have 
the default judgment vacated, agree to comply with the discovery 
order, and be allowed to proceed with his defense on the merits/':: 
There is no guarantee, of course, that he would be allowed to do 
this. If the appeal is not decided until after the trial court term 
has ended, there is apparently no way for the defendant to get 
his default judgment vacated.53 
48 Maryott v. State, 124 Neb. 274, 246 N.W. 343 (1933). 
49 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2301 (Reissue 19'48) ("When a person shall be 
convicted of an offense . . . the court may, on application of the person so 
convicted, suspend the execution of the sentence . . . for such period . 
as will give the person so convicted a reasonable time to apply for [a 
writ of error] .... "). 
uo Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-601 (Reissue 1948). 
51 Ferson v . .Armour & Co., 109 Neb. 648, 192 N.W. 125 (1923); Howell 
v. Malmgren, 79 Neb. 16, 112 N.W. 313 (1907). 
52 See Barney v. Platte Valley P.P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 376, 23 N.W.2d 
335 (1946) (district court has inherent power during term to vacate a 
default judgment). 
53 If the appeal resulted in a decision that the discovery order was cor-
rectly grantea, the withholder would have none of the grounds set forth in 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 1948) for vacating a judgment after 
term. 
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Another disadvantage in this manner of achieving review is 
that it is only available when parties to the action are involved, 
since dismissals and default judgments can be used only when 
the withholder is a party. Contempt is probably available as a 
sanction against either parties or non-parties, and does provide 
a means of review free from concern about res judicata. It also 
has its disadvantages. Of course, if the procedure is being used 
merely as a means to get review of the order, and the judge is 
satisfied there is considerable question about his decision, the 
penalty for contempt may be only nominal. This has been done 
both in Nebraska and in the federal courts.04 When this is not 
the situation, the withholder may have to go to jail. The village 
doctor cannot, however honorable his motives, occupy the county 
jail in order to preserve the privilege of his client, who may not 
even be involved in the pending action. Lawyers may find them-
selves in the same position, as might also clergymen, or any one 
else from whom privileged information is sought. As a social 
matter, it would seem that no one ought to be required to stand 
in contempt of court to get review of a discovery order, if an un-
settled legal question exists, and if there is reason to believe that 
disclosure might irreparably injure the withholder, or perhaps his 
confider.m; In that situation it is the conduct of the judge, and 
not the person against whom the order runs, which should be the 
subject of appellate concern. 
Thus we have a means of review by appeal from final judg-
ments arising out of discovery sanctions, but it is submitted that 
these means of review are inadequate. The default judgment and 
dismissal techniques are inadequate because they appy only to 
parties and involve res judicata, and contempt is inadequate be-
cause of its harshness. Furthermore, the type of sanction used 
should depend upon the importance to the inquirer's case of being 
able to get discovery, not upon whether the judge is uncertain as 
to the propriety of the discovery order. To make the type of 
sanction used depend on the latter factor would lead to the use 
of the most stringent of the sanctions, i.e., dismissal, default, 
or contempt, where the judge is least sure of the correctness of 
the discovery order. 
1a See State v. Rice, 157 Neb. 579, 60 N.W.2d 668 (1953), where the 
penalty for contempt was a fine of $1; and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495 (1947). 
r;:; See Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 31-32, 62 N.W.2d 
688, 698-699 (1954) ("It seems extremely harsh to require a litigant to 
subject himself to a contempt proceeding before a matter of this kind may 
be reviewed effectively.''). 
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B. Extraordinary Remedies 
Another means of getting review of a discovery order may 
be by the use of an extraordinary remedy. Those applicable to 
this question are prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari. 
1. Prohibition. 
An ancient common law writ, prohibition is issued by a su-
perior court to an inferior court commanding that the latter cease 
from exceeding its jurisdiction.56 While mandamus requires an 
official to perform some act or duty within his jurisdiction, pro-
hibition requires a court to refrain from doing something outside 
its jurisdiction.57 Being extraordinary in its nature, prohibition 
lies at the discretion of the court which issues it, and will lie only 
where ordinary proceedings at law, in equity, or by appeal will 
not redress the grievance.5s It is a preventive, rather than a 
corrective remedy, and traditionally will not lie to review mere 
error.59 The requisite for its use is usually considered to be a 
"jurisdictional over-reaching'' on the part of the inferior court.00 
Because of this, prohibition is not ordinarily considered a proper 
procedure for the review of discovery orders. 
In some states, however, prohibition has been used to review 
the granting of discovery orders, either by statutory construe-
561\fassman Construction Co. v. Nebraska \Vork. Comp. Ct., 141 Neb. 
270, 3 N.W.2d 639 (1942); State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 
276 N.W. 676 (1937); 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *112; High, Extra-
ordinary Legal Remedies 706-707 (3d ed. 1895). 
57 " ..• In a general sense they are counterparts of each other in their 
object and purpose, but only to the extent that one is prohibitory and the 
other mandatory; one acts on the person, the other acts on the tribunal. 
. . . Prohibition [however] is not an affirmative remedy like mandamus, 
but purely negative, for it commands not that something be done, but that 
something be left undone." 42 Am. Jur., Prohibition § 3 at 140 (1942); 
High op. cit. supra note 56 at 708. 
5SHigh, op. cit. supra note 56, at 717; State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 
133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937). 
59 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 26.37 ( 4) (2d ed. 1948); High, op. 
cit. supra note 5 6 at 717. 
60 Ibid. 
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tion,61 by court rule,62 or by merely disregarding the "jurisdiction-
al over-reaching" requirement.63 
In Nebraska, even disregarding the jurisdictional require-
ment, prohibition would apparently not be available for the re-
view of discovery orders granted by a district court. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court at one time indicated that the writ of 
prohibition was abolished in N ebraska.134 Later it was decided 
that the writ was available, but was not within the original jur-
isdiction of the supreme court.65 This would appear to make pro-
hibition available only for the review of the actions of courts in-
ferior to the district court. Since discovery procedures are pre-
sumably available in the inferior courts in Nebraska,66 the writ 
of prohibition may be available to review the granting of dis-
covery orders in those courts. However, prohibition has seldom 
61 Comment, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 124 (1953) discusses the use of the 
statutory writ of prohibition as a means of reviewing various interlocu-
tory orders. The statutory requirement that before the writ of prohibi-
tion will lie, the inferior court must have acted "without or in excess of 
its jurisdiction" is construed to include "any acts which exceed the de-
fined power of a court in any instance" so that prohibition will lie for 
"mere error." See, however, Superior Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 
37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) which held that mandamus is the 
proper means for vacating a discovery order. 
62 See Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954) allows review 
of a discovery order under Ky. Ct. App. Rule 1.420, which seems to merge 
the common law writs of prohibition and mandamus. 
63 See, e.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. 1955) where 
prohibition was used to review a discovery order, without discussion of 
the propriety of the use of prohibition, apparently relying on a suggestion 
in Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 29-32, 62 N.W.2d 688, 
698-699 (1954) that prohibition might be available for this purpose. Both 
the Jeppesen and Brown opinions were by Justice Knutson. 
4 l\Ioore, Federal Practice para. 26.37(7) (2d ed. 1948) suggests a 
relaxation of the "jurisdictional" requirement in the area of pre-trial dis-
covery orders, but the federal courts do not seem in sympathy with this 
view. See Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947); 
Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Moore, 145 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1944). 
IH State ex rel. King v. Hall, 47 Neb. 579, 66 N.W. 642 (1896) held 
that prohibition was not within the original jurisdiction of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court. This was apparently taken to mean that it was not with-
in the jurisdiction of any Nebraska court. See State ex rel. Parmenter v. 
Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 334, 152 N.W. 748 (1915) ("The common law writ 
of prohibition is abolished in this state .... "). 
6~State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1934). 
oo Neb. Rev. stat. §§ 24-502, 26-1201, 26-206, 27-1801 (Reissue 1948) 
make the provisions of the code of civil procedure (chapter 25 of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes) applicable to proceedings before justices of the 
peace, county courts, and municipal courts. Apparently this would include 
the discovery procedures. 
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been used in any court in Nebraska, and it is impossible to pre-
<lict whether or not the jurisdictional over-reaching requirement 
would be disregarded. 
2. Certiorari 
The writ of certiorari has been abolished in Nebraska,61 but 
it should be noted that several jurisdictions, including Florida,68 
Iowa,69 Montana,7° Rode Island,71 Utah,72 Washington,73 and Wis-
consin74 have used it for the review of discovery orders. 
3. Mandamus 
At least four states have used mandamus for the review 
of discovery orders. They are Alabama,75 California,76 Mich-
igan,77 and Oklahoma.78 Mandamus may be available to a limited 
extent for that purpose in Nebraska. The reasons for the belief 
that mandamus may be available, and the possible limitations on 
its use, form the remainder of our discussion of the eA'traordinary 
remedies. 
67 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1930 (Reissue 1948). 
68 Kilgore v. Bird, 149 Fla. 570, 6 So.2d 541 (1942), establishes that 
certiorari is the proper remedy to review discovery orders, rather than 
prohibition. 
69 Neufeld v. Jordan, 240 Iowa 1063, 38 N.W.2d 601 (1949); Chandler 
v. Taylor, 234 Iowa 287, 12 N.W.2d 590 (1944); l\Iain v. Ring, 219 Iowa 
1270, 260 N.W. 859 (1935); Fairbanks l\Iorse & Co. v. District Court, 
215 Iowa 703, 247 N.W. 203 (1933); Iowa Farm Credit Corp. v. Hutchi-
son, 207 Iowa 453, 223 N.W. 271 (1929); Davis v. District Court, 195 
Iowa 688, 192 N.W. 852 (1923). 
70 State ex rel. Pitcher v. District Court, 114 l\Iont. 128, 133 P.2d 350 
(1943); State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 112 l\Iont. 506, 118 P.2d 
141 (1941); and see State ex rel. Boston & Montana, etc., Co. v. District 
Court, 27 Mont. 441, 71 Pac. 602 (1903). 
71 See Broadway Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 123 Atl. 566 (R.I. 
1924). 
12 Olson v. District Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P.2d 529 (1937). 
73 State ex rel. Bronson v. Superior Court, 194 Wash. 339, 77 P.2d 997 
(1938). 
74 State ex rel. Walling v. Sullivan, 245 Wis. 180, 13 N.W.2d 550 (1944). 
75 Ex Parte Benson, 243 Ala. 435, 10 So.2d 482 (1942); Ex Parte 
Pollard, 233 Ala. 335, 171 So. 628 (1936). 
76 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 
(1951); McCarty v, Superior Court, 30 Cal.App. 1, 159 Pac. 736 (1935); 
Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 75, 292 Pac. 531 (1930). 
For general discussion, see Comment, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 102 (1950). 
11 Klett v. Hickey, 310 Mich. 329, 17 N.W.2d 201 (1945); Hallett v. 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 298 Mich. 582, 299 N.W. 723 (1941); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Smith, 163 l\Iich. 55, 127 N.W. 695 (1910); 
78 State ex rel. Westerheide v. Shilling, 190 Okla. 305, 123 P.2d 674 
(1942) (review of order denying discovery). 
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As indicated, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. By 
statute in Nebraska, it will lie only to compel performance by an 
inferior court or public official of an act which the law "specif-
ically enjoins" as a duty. It will not lie to control judicial dis-
cretion, nor will it lie where there is a "plain and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law."79 
In State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup,80 mandamus was used 
to review a discovery order. A district court had dismissed a 
personal injury action without prejudice upon the plaintiff's re-
fusal to comply with an order requiring her to submit to a phys-
ical examination. The plaintiff sought mandamus to require the 
district court to reinstate her action. It was argued that man-
damus did not lie because there was an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law by appeal from the order dismissing the 
action. The court held that appeal was not an adequate remedy 
because it might result in such delay as to practically defeat the 
plaintiff's action, even if she won on appeal. This holding was 
apparently based on the plaintiff's argument that it would take 
two years, under ordinary appeal procedure, merely to obtain 
a trial of the action.81 
If the Troup case is to be given any weight, there would be 
many situations where the remedy in the ordinary course of law 
would not be adequate. Where, as in the Troup case, mandamus 
is sought after the imposition of a sanction embodying a final 
order, mandamus would present little advantage over an appeal 
from the final order, whether it be dismissal, with or without 
prejudice, rendition of a default judgment, or a judgment of con-
tempt, except insofar as it allows a more speedy review. Since 
both mandamus actions and ordinary appeals can both be advanced 
on the docket of the supreme court, 82 mandamus has no advan-
tage in that respect. Mandamus might present an advantage in 
that it would be unnecessary to wait for the preparation of a 
transcript and bill of exceptions such as would be required on 
appeal. 
Where the sanction used to enforce compliance with the dis-
covery order is a non-final order, review by mandamus would save 
a re-trial of the action by getting the discovery question decided 
before the trial. But this does not seem to be regarded as suf-
w Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2156 (Reissue 1948). 
so 98 Neb. 333, 152 N.W. 748 (1915). 
s1 Brief for Relator, p. 15, State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb. 
333, 152 N.W. 748 (1915). 
s2 Neb. Sup. Ct. Rule 16. 
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ficient reasons for regarding the remedy by appeal as inadequate.83 
There is, of course, the possibility in this situation that the with-
holder will win the action on the merits in the trial court. 
The statutory requirement that there be a duty specifically 
enjoined by law in order for mandamus to be proper is in part 
the obverse of the statutory limitation that mandamus will not 
lie to control judicial discretion. It is more than that, however. 
It also involves the judicially construed rule that mandamus will 
not lie to review mere error,84 nor to require a court to undo that 
which it has already done.85 
As they are stated in the Nebraska cases, however, these 
latter rules concerning "mere error" and undoing what has already 
been done are almost always coupled with a statement of the rule 
that mandamus will not lie where there is an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law.86 There seems to be no statutory 
connection between these rules, but a reading of the cases sug-
gsts that the operative rule is that mandamus will not lie to cor-
rect mere error or to undo things already done unless the remedy 
in the ordinary course of law is inadequate. In the Troup case, 
for example, mandamus was said to be proper because the remedy 
by appeal was inadequate. Had the plaintiff succeeded on the 
merits, the issuance of mandamus would have compelled the trial 
court to undo what it had already done because of a mere error. 
The court also said that mandamus was proper because prohibi-
tion was "abolished," but it seems doubtful that the action of the 
83 See, e.g., State ex rel. Garton v. Fulton, 118 Neb. 400, 225 N.W. 28 
( 19 2 9), where the defendant in a criminal case demanded a jury trial in 
the county court. The county court denied it, and the district court issued 
a peremptory writ of mandamus, holding unconstitutional the statute under 
which jury trial was denied. The supreme court held that mandamus 
would not lie because there was an adequate remedy by appeal from final 
judgment. 
84 See State ex. rel. Garton v. Fulton, 118 Neb. 400, 410, 225 N.W. 28, 
32 (1929) ("Mandamus will lie to compel an inferior court to hear and 
determine a cause, if within its jurisdiction and when properly brought 
into the court. Mandamus will not lie to coerce judicial discretion of an 
inferior court, nor to predetermine the character of the judgment that the 
court shall enter. Mandamus will not issue to review the action of an 
inferior court when there is an adequate remedy at law, and the writ may 
not be used to usurp or take the place of an appeal or writ of error."); 
State ex rel. Cohn v. Jessen, 66 Neb. 515, 519, 92 N.W. 584, 596 (1902). 
85 See State ex rel. Ensey v. Churchill, 37 Neb. 702, 704, 56 N.W. 484, 
485 (1893); State ex rel. North American Cattle Co. v. l\IcGee, 32 Neb. 
149, 151, 49 N.W. 220, 222 (1891). 
86 Supra notes 84, 85. 
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trial court would today be considered a jurisdictional over-reach-
ing, so prohibition would not lie anyhow. 
So also, in State ex rel. Goff v. Dodge County,87 mandamus 
was used to compel a county board to correct errors where it ap-
peared that the board falsely made up the record to show that 
evidence was received when no evidence had actually been re-
ceived, thus preventing, as pointed out by the reviewing court, 
review by appeal or error. 
Thus where mandamus is sought to review the granting of 
a discovery order, it could be argued that mandamus is proper, 
regardless of whether it is for the review of mere error, or to 
compel undoing what has been done, it if appears that the remedy 
by appeal is not adequate. If, however, mandamus is sought be-
fore the imposition of a sanction, it would be impossible to deter-
mine what type of sanction the trial judge plans to use to com-
pel compliance, so that it could not be determined whether the 
remedy by appeal was inadequate. 
All this is not to say, however, that the Nebraska court would 
hold mandamus to be a proper remedy for the review of discovery 
orders even when a sanction had been entered. The concept that 
mandamus will lie to review "mere error" where there is not an 
adequate remedy at law has no basis in the Nebraska mandamus 
statute, and has never been positively stated in the cases. It is 
particularly doubtful that the court would hold mandamus proper 
for review of orders granting discovery in view of its apparent 
reluctance to decide such questions even when properly presented 
by petition in error from a contempt judgment.88 
87 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887). 
ss See State v. Rice, 157 Neb. 579, 60 N.W.2d 668 (1953), a proceeding 
in error from a judgment of contempt arising out of a deposition with 
subpoena duces tecum and involving the questions of the attorney's work-
product and the defendant's insurance coverage. The notice for the de-
position was defective, but this point was not raised by the parties on 
appeal. The court, however, seized upon this point and threw out the 
deposition, without even mentioning Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.32 (Supp. 
1955) which provides: "All errors and irregularities in the notice for 
taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served 
upon the party giving the notice." No objection, written or oral, was 
made until the taking of the deposition. The witness refused to testify, 
and objected that the taking of the deposition was " ... not in accordance 
with the Statutes of the State of Nebraska." Not until the party taking 
the deposition moved that the matter be certified to the district court and 
that the witness be charged with contempt did the witness object to the 
notice. The court does not say whether this objection was in writing. 
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III. STATUTORY l\!ODIFICATION OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE 
TO PROVIDE FOR REVIEW OF ORDERS GRANTING DISCOVERY 
From the preceding discussion it appears that there is in 
Nebraska no satisfactory procedure for the review of orders 
granting discovery. The use of discovery sanctions which are in 
themselves final orders provides a means of review which is avail-
able in the discretion of the trial court. But the use of these 
final orders is attended with substantial risk because res judicata 
applies to the merits in the case of default judgments or dismis-
sals with prejudice. Further, the use of final sanction orders 
against non-parties is limited to contempt judgments. Prohibi-
tion is not available for use in actions brought in the district 
court, where discovery procedures are most frequently used, be-
cause it is not within the original jurisdiction of the supreme 
court. The availability of prohibition for review of orders grant-
ing discovery in actions in courts inferior to the district court 
is doubtful because of the jurisdictional over-reaching require-
ment. Mandamus is likewise of uncertain availability, although 
within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court, because of 
the rule that it will not lie to review mere error or to enforce a 
duty not specifically enjoined by law. 
Legislation would seem to be needed to remove the uncer-
tainty which exists as to what means of reviewing discovery 
orders is available. The requisites for a procedure for review 
of orders granting discovery seem fairly obvious. It should, of 
course, avoid the evils which the final judgment rule is designed 
to avoid. It must also keep to a minimum the opportunities for 
obstructing the use of discovery procedures. 
An examination of the procedures adopted in some jurisdic-
tions, by statute or court rule, and suggested for adoption in 
other jurisdictions, allowing appeal from interlocutory orders 
before final judgment, reveals a wide range of variations. The 
procedures may be classified as follows 
A. Appeal as of right ;s9 
B. Appeal on leave granted by 
I 
1. the trial court, in its discretion, 
a. on motion of a party,90 or 
89 See notes 33, 34, 35, and 36 supra. 
90 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 490.9, 502.20, 547.30 (1955); Mass. Ann. 
Laws c. 214, § 30, c. 215, § 13, c. 231, § 111 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. §-
605.09 (1947) (orders overruling demurrers); Miss. Code Ann. § 114$. 
• 
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b. at the joint request of all the parties, 93 or 
2. an appellate court, in its discretion, 
a. on motion of a party,92 or 
b. at the joint request of all parties, 21 or 
c. after leave granted by the trial court, 94' or 
d. after leave denied by the trial court.95 
We shall discuss here the mechanics of the operation of these 
procedures, with a view toward suggesting a procedure which 
would operate satisfactorily for review of discovery orders in 
Nebraska. 
A. Appeal as of Right. 
One of the benefits of discovery procedure is that it expedites 
the disposal of litigation by exposing sham claims and def ens es, 
and by reducing the issues at the trial to those over which there 
is a real conflict. Another benefit is to make easy and inexpen-
sive the proof of facts which would otherwise be difficult and 
expensive to prove.96 Probably one of the basic benefits also is 
the possibility that the withholder, realizing he can be forced to 
disclose information, will do so upon request without requiring 
the inquirer to use the discovery procedures. To give the with-
holder the right to an appeal, before final judgment, from every 
order granting discovery, would give the withholder a delaying 
weapon which might greatly reduce the effectiveness of the dis-
covery procedures in producing these benefits, which is the very 
evil against which the final judgment rule is designed to guard. 
For this reason, appeal as of right is unsuitable as a procedure for 
review of orders granting discovery. 
(1942) (specified decrees and orders in equity); R.I. Gen. Laws c. 545, 
§ 5 (1938), R.I. Public Laws c. 545, § 6 (1940); Vt. Rev. Stat. § 2124 
(1947); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788 (1949) (questions arising on sum-
mons or pleadings) . 
91 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7967 (1949). 
92 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 101.30 (Supp. 1956) (order granting a new 
trial); Iowa R. Civ. P. 332(a); La. Code Prac. Ann. art. 566, (1942); 
N.J. App. Div. rule 2:2-3(a) (4), (b); N.Y. Civ. Prac. act. § 589; S.D. 
Code § 33.0701(6) (1939); Utah R. Civ. P. 72(b). 
03 W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788 (1949). 
SH Del Sup. Ct. rule 20(2) (a), (b), (c), Del. Super. Ct. (Civ.) rule 
75, Del. Ch. Ct. Rule 72(b). 
9o Miss. Code Ann. § 1148 (1942). 
9G See 4 1\Ioore, Federal Practice para. 26.02 at 1014-1016 (2d ed. 1950) 
for an outline of the benefits of discovery procedure. 
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B. Appeal by Leave of Court 
The method of interlocutory appeal which leaves allowance 
of the appeal to the discretion of some court, either trial, appellate, 
or both, would seem to be better than an appeal as of right, so 
far as concerns the review of orders granting discovery. Some 
jurisdictions which use this type of procedure impose limitations 
upon the exercise of the court's discretion in allowing the appeal. 
Since the justification for an appeal from orders granting dis-
covery is that there appears a likelihood that irreparable injury 
will result from an erroneous determination of the law by the 
trial court, there should also be a requirement that there is a 
likelihood that the trial court has determined the law incorrectly, 
i.e., that the order raises a question of law ·.vhich is unsettled in 
the jurisdiction. 
The problem in the area of interlocutory appeals by leave of 
coart which has provoked the most heated discussion is whether 
the trial court or an appellate court should make the decision as 
to whether an interlocutory appeal should be allowed in a par-
ticular case.97 
It has been suggested, in favor of vesting discretion in the 
trial court to allow the appeal, that the trial judge is better qual-
ified, through a more intimate knowledge of the facts of the case, 
to decide whether appeal should be allowed to avoid irreparable 
injury, and that this would avoid interrupting the progress of 
the case to decide whether appeal should be allowed.08 Certainly 
this procedure would avoid the objection made to the appeal as 
of right that the appellate courts would be swamped with appeals. 
provided the trial judge has sufficient objectivity to decide which 
appeals should be allowed and which should not. A too timid 
judge might allow almost every appeal asked. This could be con-
trolled, however, by also giving the appellate court discretion to 
deny the right to appeal after it has been granted by the trial 
court. 
If, however, the trial judge were to be e},,-tremely hesitant 
about allowing appeals from his rulings, either because he is con-
01 For discussions of this topic, principally in connection with Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(b), see Comment, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1106, 1111 (1950); Note, 
15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 504, 512 (1942); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1186, 1190-
1192 (1949); Note, 55 Yale L.J. 141, 149 (1946). 
ossee Note, 15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 504, 512 (1942). 
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vinced that the order is correct99 or because he feels that inter-
locutory appeals are generally unwise, a procedure which provided 
review of his decision not to allow the appeal might unduly burden 
the appellate court. 
Appli~tions for leave to appeal might also be unduly bur-
densome under a procedure by which the decision of whether to 
allow the appeal lay initially with the appellate court. Although 
the court could control the number of appeals it heard, it could 
not easily control the number of applications for leave to appeal 
without laying down rather specific standards which would de-
stroy the flexibility needed in determining whether, in any given 
case, irreparable injury is likely. 
The wisdom of laying down specific standards is involved 
where the determination of whether the appeal should be allowed 
is at the trial court level. If discretion to allow appeals is in 
the trial judge, one judge may be much more liberal in allowing 
appeals than another.100 The only way to avoid this difficulty is 
to set down specific standards for the allowance of appeals, or 
to provide for complete review of the trial court's determination. 
These considerations led the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, in considering the advisability of a procedure for inter-
locutory appeals, to recommend a procedure allowing appeal in 
the discretion of the court of appeals after a finding by the dis-
trict court, in issuing an order, that the order involved: 
" ... a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal 
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation .... "101 
This proposal was directed toward the early disposition of ques-
tions which would be controlling in anti-trust and similar pro-
tracted litigation. The same body disapproved a proposal which 
would have given the courts of appeals discretion to allow the 
appeal with the comment that it would " ... unduly encourage 
fragmentary and frivolous appeals with the evils and delays in-
99 See Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 952 (2d Cir. 1947) (concurring 
opinion by Judge Frank, " ... experience teaches that a trial judge, mis-
takenly convinced that his order is flawless and that an appeal would be 
useless, may well be unwilling to expedite its review .... "); Note, 15 So. 
Calif. L. Rev. 504, 506 (1942). 
100 Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1947), citing as an example 
the lack of uniformity among federal district judges in sentencing. See 
also Note, 15 So Calif. L. Rev. 504, 512 (1942). 
101 Jud. Conf. U.S . .Ann. Rep. 27 (1953). 
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cident thereto. . . ."102 It might be doubted that the number of 
appeals from orders granting discovery in Nebraska would be 
such as to "swamp" the Nebraska Supreme Court with appeals if 
discretion to allow interlocutory appeals were given that court, 
but it is impossible to predict whether a procedure for interlocu-
tory appeals would be used merely for delay. Perhaps the best 
way to accomplish the purpose of preventing irreparable injury 
resulting from an incorrect determination of the law by the trial 
court in granting a discovery order, yet avoiding "fragmentary 
and frivolous" appeals, is a procedure somewhat like that sug-
gested by the Judicial Conference, with however, the decision of 
the trial court limited to and conclusive on the question of whether 
irreparable injury is likely to result. The supreme court would 
be left the question of whether there was substantial ground for 
difference of opinion as to the law. This would both give uni-
formity in the allowance of appeals, and prevent overburdening 
of the supreme court, while taking advantage of the better know-
ledge of the facts by the trial court on the question of whether 
there was likely to be irreparable injury. 
A finding by either the trial or appellate court that there 
were not sufficient grounds for an interlocutory appeal should 
have the effect of foreclosing review of the propriety of the order 
granting discovery on appeal from final judgment, since such 
review would be too late to prevent injury anyhow. 
Where the parties are agreed that irreparable injury may 
result from enforcement of the discovery order, a stipulation 
should be allowed to take the place of the trial court's finding, 
as on any other issue of fact. 
In order to make the appeal speedy and inexpensive, there 
should be only a short time allowed after the order is entered for 
the application for leave to appeal to be made. After a finding 
by the trial court that the appeal is necessary to prevent irrepar-
able injury, the supreme court should have power to determine 
the manner and time within which the application for leave to 
appeai must be submitted to it. Such appeal could, if necessary, 
be advanced on the docket of the supreme court. 
In the discussion of the proposed procedure for interlocutory 
appeals from orders granting discovery, we have assumed that 
the order is granted by the district court, and appeal would be 
to the supreme court. Where the order is granted by a court in-
ferior to the district court, it is possible that prohibition, which 
102 Jud. Conf. U.S. Ann. Rep. 203 (1952). 
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is within the jurisdiction of the district court, may lie to review 
the order. If prohibition is available, it would seem to be ade-
quate for the review of such orders, and until its availability has 
been determined, we make no suggestion as to whether a pro-
cedure for interlocutory appeal should be provided for inferior 
courts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the means presently existing for review 
of orders granting discovery in the district court in Nebraska are 
inadequate, and that the procedure here would provide a satis-
factory means of review without overburdening the supreme 
court or appreciably interfering with the use of discovery pro-
cedures in Nebraska. 
William H. Sherwood, '56 
Clark Nichols, Jr., '56 
